The paralysis in decision making in New Delhi is adversely affecting India’s national security.
Pakistani troops ambushed and killed five Indian soldiers belonging to the 21 Bihar regiment and 14 Maratha Light Infantry on Tuesday. The Pakistani troops crossed the Line of Control into Poonch to carry out the attack.
Several theories have been put forward to explain the attack on the Indian patrol. Was this retaliation to news reports in Pakistan which claimed that Indian troops kidnapped four men from PoK? Is this just another manifestation of Pakistan’s escalating hostilities towards India in Afghanistan? Are hardline elements in Pakistan’s armed forces attempting to discredit and derail Nawaz Sharif’s alleged attempts to make peace with India? Interesting questions, and maybe they will be answered in time and as more facts pertaining to the attack are revealed. But reactions to Tuesday’s incident, like those during the January 2013 incident, point to a larger crisis in national security management in India.
A quick word first about Nawaz Sharif. Whatever his intentions are with regard to India, India must judge Pakistan by its actions and not by warm and fuzzy notions of a trans-Punjab lovefest. The problem with Pakistan’s peace brigade is that there is a significant gap between purported intentions and their ability to deliver on them.
The net result to India is that its neighboring environment continues to remain hostile and threats to its internal security persist. In this regard, it would be silly for India to get entangled in a debate over whether Nawaz Sharif wants peace with India or not. Instead, India must judge Pakistan by its actions and not by the supposed intentions of some of its leaders. As my colleague Nitin Pai argues, there is no case for India to engage the Nawaz Sharif government in dialog until there is credible proof of intent.
But to return to the August 6 attack on Indian troops, such incidents along the LoC are hardly new, regrettable though the loss of life is. The Pakistanis have always attempted to stir up tensions long the LoC to aid in the infiltration of terrorists across the LoC or to elevate the visibility of tensions with India on the global stage. Tuesday’s attack wasn’t the first of its kind and will not be the last. There will surely be a tactical Indian military response to the provocation, and the Pakistanis are well aware that the response will come sooner than later. This isn’t war mongering but merely a reflection of the realities of the situation along the LoC.
However, what should be of concern to us is the manner in which Indian leadership has chosen to respond to the attack. Browse through statements issued by representatives of India’s political parties and it becomes apparent very quickly that objective number one was to either blame or deflect blame (depending on who you were) for the attack.
BJP MP and former External Affairs minister Yashwant Sinha asked whether the Congress was with Pakistan or India (I mean, really?), while Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi affirmed that “the entire Congress party, as indeed the entire country” stood with the families of those killed. As ever, party first, country second.
In fact, further reading into statements issued in response to the attack tells us that there isn’t much consensus of opinion even within the UPA, much less between the UPA and other parties. Defense Minister AK Antony, whose indifference to defending anything beyond his own reputation is now a thing of legend, alleged that the attackers were in fact terrorists masquerading as Pakistan army regulars, which contradicted the positions of almost every other UPA leader to have spoken on the subject. It also happened to contradict the position of the army. What is the Indian citizen supposed to make of the political theatrics that get played out with each bomb blast or border incident?
Confidence in India’s political leadership and national security institutions is eroding. There has been systematic atrophy of existing institutions charged with managing India’s national security. Worse, vested parties, both political and otherwise, have effectively stonewalled urgent reforms needed to our national security apparatus. This includes the implementation of a recommendation first made 14 years ago in the Kargil Review Committee report that would allow the prime minister of the country to receive direct and timely military input.
The acute paralysis in consensus-building and decision making in New Delhi is now affecting India’s national security. This cannot continue to be swept under the carpet. If India’s leaders can’t even evolve political consensus on an expected and routine Pakistani provocation along the LoC, what sort of response do we imagine we can expect when we are faced with more serious challenges to our national security?