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Archive | September, 2013

Urdunama: Alvida, Manmohan Singh

So, having been the source of a well-directed plant that led to commotion and friction between India and Pakistan in New York, Hamid Mir in a column in today’s Jang entitled “Alvida, Manmohan Singh” argues that the end is nigh where Manmohan Singh’s tenure as PM is concerned and that Pakistan is better off waiting for India’s general elections to conclude before pursuing dialog on bilateral issues.  Excerpts follow:

Nawaz Sharif’s attempts at bringing to attention the Kashmir issue in New York angered Manmohan Singh who then used his meeting with U.S. president Barack Obama to spread propaganda against Pakistan and level accusations against us during his UNGA address.

But Manmohan Singh forgets that the attack on the Samjhauta Express occurred during his own tenure and that there has yet to be any sentencing, despite the fact that a retired colonel of the Indian army was identified as being involved in the incident.  Indeed, during Dr. Singh’s tenure, a covert unit under the command of Gen. VK Singh was planning to spread terror in Pakistan.

There is no doubt that non-state actors from Pakistan have targeted India; however, these non-state actors have been targeting Pakistan far more than they have India over the last few years.  Such non-state actors are also present in India.  But India ignores its internal actors and blames Pakistan instead.

Nawaz Sharif was clear in his conversations with Manmohan Singh that Pakistan desires peace, but let India not mistake this desire as a sign of weakness.  Nawaz Sharif’s inclusion of Kashmir in his address to the UNGA angered Manmohan Singh enough to complain to Barack Obama.  Perhaps Manmohan Singh was under the illusion that Barack Obama had a remote through which he could control Nawaz Sharif’s speech and compel him to not bring up the Kashmir issue at the UNGA.

Ultimately, Nawaz Sharif did meet with Manmohan Singh, but this was a meeting to bid farewell.  Manmohan Singh’s tenure as PM will end in a few months.  He will retire and perhaps write a memoir recollecting his inconclusive negotiations with Gen. Musharraf.  Pakistan and Nawaz Sharif, however, should pursue plans for rapprochement with a new leadership after the elections in India.  [روزنامہ جنگ]

What does this all mean for India?  As a result of the meeting between Dr. Singh and Nawaz Sharif, the DGMOs of India and Pakistan are set to meet to discuss plans to restore the sanctity of the LoC.  However, Pakistan apparently doesn’t see any incentive to restore the ceasefire until it is able to negotiate with an Indian leadership post the general elections in May 2014.

Translation for India: expect a hot border for the next several months.  The LoC ceasefire is not likely to be restored any time soon.

 

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Storytelling in New York

Will the real Hamid Mir please stand up?

The great thaw in Indo-Pakistan ties that some hoped for in New York is degenerating rapidly into a farce.  When the new civilian administration came to power in Pakistan, it appeared eager to improve relations with India.  Mian Nawaz Sharif said his agenda for peace with India in his previous tenure was derailed by Gen. Musharraf.

Then in August, five Indian soldiers were killed by Pakistani troops, who ventured across the LoC into J&K  to carry out the attack. Mr. Sharif offered to meet Prime Minister Singh at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Initially cool to the offer given an increasing number of LoC violations, the PM eventually agreed to a meeting.

In his speech at the UNGA, Mr. Sharif said he hoped for a “new beginning” with India.  He then ushered in this new beginning by raking up the Kashmir issue, warning that the “suffering of people cannot be brushed under the carpet, because of power politics.” With the atmosphere vitiated, Dr. Singh responded in his own speech by asserting that Jammu & Kashmir was an integral part of India and that “there can never, ever, be a compromise with the unity and territorial integrity of India.”

While Pakistan and India were busy reverting to predictable and boring positions in the Big Apple, drama was unfolding in Pakistan.  Hamid Mir, journalist and CEO of Geo Television, appeared via phone on a Pakistani show called “Aapas ki Baat” to update viewers on his meeting with Nawaz Sharif this morning.

Mr. Mir put it across that Mr. Sharif was unhappy with the Indian PM’s speech and discussions about Pakistan with U.S. president Barack Obama.  Nawaz Sharif, Mr. Mir said, told NDTV Group Editor Barkha Dutt that Dr. Singh was behaving not like a prime minister but like a “dehati aurat.” On Twitter today, Ms. Dutt refuted and provided context to Mr. Mir’s distorted version of events.

Mr. Mir hosts a show called “Aman ki Asha” on Geo TV, which aims to, among other things, improve relations between India and Pakistan.  But as a columnist in the Pakistani Urdu newspaper, Jang, Mr. Mir is far more open to towing the line of the Pakistani establishment on India, including issues pertaining to Kashmir and popular, but imagined conspiracy theories on India’s involvement in everything that happens in Pakistan.

Just this past week, Mr. Mir authored a piece in the Jang about claims and counterclaims between the UPA and Gen. VK Singh with regard to Pakistan.  The column titled “Yeh koi nayi baat nahi” (This is nothing new) is replete with fantastic conspiracy theories that suggest Indian involvement in the 1996 bombing of Imran Khan’s Shaukat Khanum cancer hospital.  Excerpts follow:

The prime minister (Benazir Bhutto) called for a meeting with the chief minister of Punjab and the IG and directed them to find those responsible for the Shaukat Khanum Hospital blast as quickly as possible.  Within a few days, the police arrested a young man named Ishaq Mirasi from a village along the border.  Ishaq Mirasi was also wanted in connection with the bombing of Lahore Airport’s old terminal.

The arrest notwithstanding, I was skeptical as to the connection between this poor villager and the Shaukat Khanum Hospital….I ended up conducting a detailed interview of Ishaq Mirasi in prison.  Ishaq told me that he was involved in petty smuggling.  On one such occasion while crossing the border into India, he was arrested by Indian army personnel.

An Indian army officer asked him whether he would prefer a long prison sentence in India or was instead willing to work (for the Indian army).  When Ishaq chose the latter, he was given training in bomb making and sent back to Pakistan.  After completing his mission, he would cross the border into India and provide Pakistani English-language newspapers covering the blasts as evidence to receive his payment…

…Interior Minister Nasirullah Babar told me India was trying to recruit the poor and unemployed in Lahore, Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar and was financing sectarian organizations to promote discord between the Sunnis and Shias.

[On Gen VK Singh’s comments]… This is nothing new. It is possible that the military intelligence unit targeting Pakistan has been disbanded  But R&AW’s covert intelligence units continue their operations against Pakistan.

Instead of putting on an act of friendship, Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh (if they meet in New York) ought to discuss how India and Pakistan can put an end to conspiring against each other    [روزنامہ جنگ]

Civilian leaders in Pakistan have met Dr. Singh in the past without there being extra-circular activities from the Pakistani military establishment.  Former Pakistan prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, whose Pakistan Peoples Party enjoyed anything but cordial relations with the army, met Dr. Singh in Sharm el-Sheikh and later on in Mohali during the India-Pakistan cricket World Cup semi-final.

But Mr. Sharif’s attempts at outreach seem to coincide with violations along the LoC, an attack this week on a police station and army camp in Jammu & Kashmir, and now apparently targeted information operations with a view to scuttle talks between Dr. Singh and Mr. Sharif in New York.  The question that needs to be asked then is what was Mr. Sharif willing to offer or discuss with the Indian PM that has so ruffled the feathers of the Pakistani military-jihadi complex.

As for Hamid Mir, it would be sadly ironical for the host of a show called “Aman ki Asha” to be responsible for putting paid to Mr. Sharif’s attempts at improving ties with India. It behooves Mr. Mir to respond.

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Winning the small nuclear battles

Dr. Singh and Mr. Obama must move forward on nuclear trade when they meet this week.

Some newspapers and political parties would have us believe that the PM is in New York with the express intention of selling India’s soul to America.

They contend that India’s Nuclear Liability Act (NLA), which allows for costs to be imposed on the supplier in the event of a nuclear disaster in India, is about to be sold down the river by the PM in order to remove impediments to the participation of U.S. firms in civil nuclear trade with India.  There was furor when it emerged that the Attorney General had issued an opinion indicating that the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPCIL) had the right to waive the liability provision, if provided for in a contract.

Outraged opposition parties and left-leaning media outlets argued that India was bypassing its own law to please the U.S.  A few observations on the subject:

The language in the NLA appears to be fairly clear on the applicability of supplier liability.  Clause 17 reads:

The operator of the nuclear installation, after paying the compensation for nuclear
damage in accordance with section 6, shall have a right of recourse where-

(a)    such right is expressly provided for in a contract in writing;
(b)    the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his
employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects
or sub-standard services;
(c)    the nuclear incident has resulted from the act of commission or omission of
an individual done with the intent to cause nuclear damage.  [THE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE ACT, 2010]

We’ll leave matters relating to the legal interpretation of the language in the Act to the experts on the subject, but if our admittedly untrained legal interpretation is correct, clause 17(a) does allow for supplier-side liability if “expressly provided for” in a contract between the operator (in most cases, GoI) and the supplier.

If this is indeed true, then the question of “bypassing” Indian law simply doesn’t arise.  The law itself does not make supplier-side liability mandatory.  Further, it the begs question of what the opposition — which was out screaming blue murder this past month — was doing when the bill was being debated in 2010.  Even assuming their very busy schedule of staging walkouts in Parliament got in the way of them expressing an opinion when the bill was being debated, what have they been doing the past two years since its enactment?

The NLA in its current state is simply incompatible with the IAEA Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC), which India undertook a commitment to accede to.  Contingent on these incompatibilities, India has signed the CSC but not ratified it, as ratification would require a change in our liability laws.  It is strange then that we appear so eager to be brought into the mainstream of the global framework for civil nuclear commerce and yet not want to be bound by its rules.

The issues pertaining to supplier-side liability are not U.S.-specific.  The truth is that no one is willing to do business with India given the costs imposed by the NLA on suppliers.  The Russians have refused to bring Kudankulam 3 and 4 under the ambit of the NLA.  The French company Areva has also made it clear that it will not be able to move forward, given the language in the NLA. The Canadians have expressed reservations.  Potential Indian suppliers themselves appear to be uneasy with supplier-side liability with FICCI warning that the NLA “threatens to completely undo the government’s efforts to accelerate nuclear power generation…”

The AG’s interpretation that the operator had the ability to contractually invoke or exclude supplier-side liability actually dates back to October 2012, when his legal opinion was provided during negotiations on Kudamkulam with the Russians.  There was not so much as a whimper in the left-leaning media then, but apparently now this interpretation causes a “dilution” in our liability laws to allow the prime minister to carry as a “gift” to the U.S.

The Cold War ended two decades ago, folks.  There is no benefit in India pretending to be more soviet than the Soviet Union in 2013.

Many in India are yet to appreciate the impact the NLA has had on the general mood towards India in DC.  This was about more than just nuclear commerce.  Presidents of the U.S. do not make phone calls to their Chinese counterparts asking them to drop their opposition to a third country’s bid for an NSG waiver merely at the prospect of being able to sell few nuclear reactors.  India would have most likely remained a nuclear paraih were it not for the efforts of the Bush administration.

Since obtaining an NSG waiver, the UPA has bungled like only it can.  Debates on nuclear liability were emotive rather than pragmatic, drawing wrong lessons from the Bhopal tragedy.  While the NLA automatically precluded the possibility of the participation of U.S. companies in civil nuclear commerce with India, companies in Russia and France, which were initially underwritten by their governments, were able to enter into exploratory discussions with India.  With Russia and France no longer willing to abide by the NLA, the prime minister arrives in the U.S. attempting to salvage a relationship and an economy.

Realistically, neither the U.S. nor India have each other on their list of top priorities at the moment. The Obama administration is faced with a precarious situation in Syria and is battling opposition on healthcare reform and budget disputes.  Meanwhile, with India heading to polls in May 2014, the UPA is effectively in a holding pattern with very little political capital at its disposal for brave new ideas.

Under the circumstances, if a pre-early works agreement can indeed be concluded between NPCIL and Westinghouse, it might help arrest the doom and gloom and allow both sides to reevaluate positions sometime next year.  This is about as much as we can hope for when Dr. Singh and Mr. Obama meet on Friday.

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Don’t fear the MIRVs!

India’s induction of MIRVs can enhance nuclear stability in Asia.

Yesterday’s Times of India carries excerpts from the Federation of American Scientists’ report entitled “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2013.” It’s co-author, Hans Kristensen, spoke to the Times of India on reports that future enhancements to India’s strategic missiles would carry multiple independent targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs):

Kristensen told TOI that MIRVs are not in keeping with New Delhi’s policy of minimum deterrence and that Indian officials needed to explain why they want to develop the technology because it could lead to a buildup with China. “MIRV is developed for a particular strategic objective, normally to quickly increase the number of warheads deployed on missiles or to be able to hit a lot of targets in a single attack. Both of those objectives are incompatible with India’s policy of minimum deterrence because they would significantly increase the size of the arsenal and signal a shift to a nuclear counterforce war-fighting doctrine,” Kristensen told TOI.

The report says that such moves by India and China could set off an increased and more intense nuclear arms race in Asia. “The United States, Russia, and the international arms control community should discourage this competition by significantly curtailing their own MIRVed weapon systems and ballistic missile defense programs,” it says. [Times of India]

Mr. Kristensen’s statements defy logic because the development and deployment of MIRVs is not only in keeping with India’s nuclear weapons doctrine, they are an essential component of it.  India’s policy of No First Use (NFU) means that it must necessarily ensure both the survivability of its nuclear assets in the event of a preemptive attack by an adversary, as well as maintain the ability to respond in a manner that will impose unacceptable costs on the enemy.

Both components of the NFU (i.e., survivability of its arsenal and assured imposition of unacceptable costs) will be enhanced through the induction of MIRVs.  This better assures the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent, which, in turn, also enhances nuclear stability between India and China.

India has quite lucidly articulated its position in its Nuclear Doctrine (emphasis added):

2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only”, the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that :

(a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat: and (b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor

4.3(i):  India’s nuclear forces and their command and control shall be organised for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response. They shall be designed and deployed to ensure survival against a first strike and to endure repetitive attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor. [Federation of American Scientists] (1999 Draft)

The nuclear programs of both China and India continue to evolve today, thereby contributing to a more competitive nuclear dynamic in the region, whether one side would acknowledge it or not.  A legitimate question for us to ask here is whether both countries (and the region) would be better served and stability enhanced if India and China were to engage each other in nuclear confidence building measures.

The answer, of course, is yes.  India for its part has indicated an interest in entering into a strategic dialog on nuclear issues with China.  However, not only does China continue to refuse to engage India in talks over nuclear CBMs, it remains unwilling to even acknowledge India as a nuclear weapons power.

India’s options are indeed limited if China simply refuses to talk. Meanwhile, territorial disputes between India and China remain unresolved, China’s clandestine assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program — brazenly flouting all non-proliferation norms — continues, and its belligerence towards India and other neighbors has increased in proportion to its growing global clout. Under such circumstances, efforts to enhance the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent are both necessary and entirely in keeping with India’s national security interests.

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