Archive | Lashkar-e-Taiba RSS feed for this section

Explaining Hafiz Saeed’s recent engagements

Many on Twitter noted that LeT/JuD chief Hafiz Saeed delivered a lecture at an event sponsored by a student group from Lahore’s University of Engineering and Technology (UET).  He also subsequently addressed a public rally in Islamabad and attended a ceremony to hand over ambulances to a district’s emergency services unit, an event at which Islamabad’s Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police was present.

Yet, none of this is news.  Hafiz Saeed is not in hiding — like Osama bin Laden was — nor has he been found guilty of any crime by Pakistan.  Saeed isn’t holed up in a cave.  His Markaz-e-Taiba complex in Muridke is spread across 200 acres, and has been a recipient of generous grants from the Government of Punjab.  When the United States announced a bounty on Hafiz Saeed in 2012, Saeed taunted the U.S. with a challenge: “catch me if you can.”

But this isn’t just bravado.  Hafiz Saeed benefits greatly from his carefully cultivated image as a mujahid, an indispensable asset of the Pakistani security establishment against India, a public figure and philanthropist.  His Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), ostensibly a charitable wing of JuD, has assisted in rescue and rehabilitation efforts during calamities in Pakistan (such as the 2005 earthquake, or after the many regular bouts of flooding).

In many circumstances, the FIF is reported to have arrived even before the state’s emergency services to provide aid to those in need.  Taken as a whole, this puts Saeed in a different category from the run-of-the-mill jihadi who might be used by the state to do its bidding and then disposed if and when no longer needed.

Historically, Hafiz Saeed’s public engagements and outreach have served two primary, if often related, purposes: to rally public opinion in favor of a nationalist cause favored by the army, or to pressure the incumbent civilian government on issues pertaining to Pakistan’s fragile civil-military relations.

These recent engagements come at a time when there is turmoil in the relationship between Nawaz Sharif’s government and the army, led by Gen. Raheel Sharif, on multiple axes: relations with India, domestic counter-terrorism and corruption.  On April 13, 2016, Hafiz Saeed was interviewed in Nawa-i-waqt by the decidedly right-leaning columnist Fazal Hussain Awan, where he spoke at length on one of the areas of contention between the government and army: India.

Excerpts from Mr. Awan’s op-ed and the interview with Hafiz Saeed follow:

India has accused Pakistan of being involved in the 2016 attacks in Pathankot and the 2007 (sic) attacks in Mumbai.  According to India, Jamaat ud-Dawa’s chief Hafiz Saeed and his associates were responsible for the Mumbai attacks, while Jaish-e-Mohammad’s leader Maulana Masood Azhar was accused of carrying out the attacks in Pathankot.  India approached the UN on both occasions and the UN, under the influence of Indian propaganda, proscribed the Jamaat ud-Dawah and Hafiz Saeed.

The Zardari government also arrested Hafiz Saeed and his associates.  Then Interior Minister Rehman Malik moved the case to the Supreme Court, which, after deliberation, found Hafiz Saeed innocent.  India was outraged at the verdict and protested, but there is no higher authority than the Supreme Court to which the case can be referred in Pakistan.

India reacted in a similar manner to the attack in Pathankot.  Having accused Maulana Masood Azhar, India took its case to the UN.  However, because of Pakistan’s active diplomacy at the UN and China’s assistance, India’s attempts to proscribe Masood Azhar were defeated.  On Mumbai, the Pakistan Peoples Party reacted defensively which led to JuD’s leadership coming under India’s diplomatic assault.

Thanks to China’s active intervention, the attempt to proscribe Masood Azhar was vetoed.  However, India continues to demand Pakistani action on Hafiz Saeed despite the fact that the Supreme Court has found him not guilty and has allowed him to continue to lead his life as a free citizen of the country.

I have no personal connection with Hafiz sahib, but was able to meet with him through some acquaintances I have in his media team.  Both Yahya Mujahid [LeT/JuD spokesman] and Muhammad Irshad [JuD media person?] were present at the meeting. During our conversation, Hafiz Saeed talked to us about the most difficult moments of his life.

“I was a student at Punjab University when unrest broke out in East Pakistan,” Saeed sahib told us.  “India entered the conflict, supported the Mukti Bahini, and with the aid of the West, defeated Pakistan in 1971.  Approximately 93,000 Pakistan Army troops were taken prisoners of war by India.  I was unable to sleep or eat for several days.”

“It is then that I came to the realization that until we avenge the defeat and until India is degraded and destroyed, neither Pakistan nor its Islamic values can be saved.  I decided then that India must pay the price for the fall of Dhaka.”

Hafiz Saeed said that terrorists and their sponsors are being apprehended in Pakistan and that the capture of Kulbhushan Yadav has exposed R&AW’s network in Pakistan.  According to Saeed, “India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is the ‘mastermind’ of terrorism in Pakistan and yet Pakistan’s leaders are apprehensive about holding him accountable.”

Saeed despairs that Pakistan’s politicians are no longer interested in the Kashmir cause and instead blindly tow the line of the West.  Yet on Kashmir, Saeed reposes his faith in the Pakistan Army.  He says that the Pakistan Army is sincere in its commitment to the Kashmir cause, as are the people of Pakistan. The Kashmir issue can be resolved if Pakistan’s politicians display the same level of commitment.

Speaking on Pakistan’s ideology [Nazaria Pakistan], Hafiz Saeed says “I’m not a great fan of cricket, but when India lost to the West Indies, there was a lot of joy in Pakistan.  In fact, more sweets are distributed in Occupied Kashmir than even in Pakistan on such occasions. The slogan ‘Pakistan Zindabad!’ resonates from Srinagar to Jawaharlal University in Delhi.  This is a testament to Pakistan’s enduring ideology and the Two Nation Theory.” [وائے وقت]

 

Read full story · Comments are closed

Pakistan’s sophistry on Jamaat ud-Dawah

Nawaz Sharif’s claims of zero tolerance on terrorism have zero credibility.

India’s civil society and its political leaders across all hues shared the grief of ordinary Pakistanis after the barbaric attack in Peshawar where 132 school children were massacred by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.  In the days following the brutal attack, former Pakistani DG-ISI Hameed Gul, former army chief Pervez Musharraf and Jamaat ud-Dawah’s amir Hafiz Saeed blamed India for the attack even though the TTP had already accepted responsibility.  Jamaat ud-Dawah — the “charity organization” — then held a Ghazwah-e-Hind conference barely a week after the Peshawar tragedy; its loud banner threatened to exterminate India.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a televised address to his country, proclaimed that the “Peshawar atrocity has changed Pakistan…history will never forgive us if we do not eliminate the curse of terrorism.”  He announced a 20-point National Plan of Action against terrorism which envisaged, among other things, zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab.

Right off the bat, the Sharif government found itself having to explain to India and to the rest of the world how Lashkar-e-Taiba’s operational chief, Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi, who had allegedly been cooling his heels in prison for having orchestrated the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, was about to be released on bail.  The Sharif government has since had to apply the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) ordinance to effectively prevent Lakhvi’s release.

Many in India have quite rightly been skeptical of some news reports that Pakistan was planning to ban the Jamaat ud-Dawah.  Many will remember that Pakistan had claimed that it had  “banned” the JuD one month after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, so it is not clear how it is now contemplating banning an already-banned organization.  We know from Hafiz Saeed’s public appearances, his keynote addresses — of all places — in Lahore’s High Court, and the magazines and literature his organization is able to freely distribute, that neither he nor the JuD are proscribed in Pakistan.

But let’s not take my word for it, let’s just hear it from a Pakistani government official.  Enter stage right, Pakistan’s Minister for Defense Production, Rana Tanveer Hussain who spake thus on Jan 17:

JuD is a charitable organisation and the government of Pakistan has no evidence against Hafiz Saeed or the JuD…The JuD does not have a military wing and they are only involved in preaching Islam and working in the education field…The JuD only pinches India, not Afghanistan or America. You can’t group it along with ISIS and al Qaeda. [The Hindustan Times]

So the JuD is a “charitable organization” that “pinches” India? What sort of charitable organization “pinches” other countries? If we had to be charitable, we would say that Mr. Hussain was being naive.

And “pinches”? Pakistan’s historical euphemism to refer to the India-specific terrorists it bred was “freedom fighters.”  Apparently there’s been a change in nomenclature.  These freedom fighters are now “pinchers.”

But Mr. Hussain’s story is, as the Brits would say, total codswallop.

UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (under the “al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee”) proscribed the LeT (QEL 118.05) and declared the JuD to be its front organization (the UN also sanctioned Hafiz Saeed).  As a UN member state, Pakistan ultimately must comply with these resolutions.  The U.S. Department of State also added Jamaat ud-Dawah (along with al-Anfal Trust, Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool and others) as aliases of the already-proscribed Lashkar-e-Taiba.  Hafiz Saeed himself has been on the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list for quite a while.

Incidentally, Mr. Hussain’s sophistry converges with Hafiz Saeed’s.  In an interview with the Urdu daily Ummat in 2012, Hafiz Saeed claimed he had nothing to do with Lashkar-e-Taiba and that the LeT was a Kashmiri group:

1990-91 saw the birth of organized “armed resistance” against India’s occupation [of Kashmir].  Among the organizations fighting India’s occupation was a group called Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).  This organization and its setup was based exclusively in Kashmir.  There was never any relationship between the JuD and the LeT, nor was any leader of the JuD ever the head of the LeT.  But a section of India’s media has consistently spread propaganda alleging that I am the leader of the LeT. [روزنامہ امّت]

Very interesting.  Perhaps Hafiz Saeed thinks the world has forgotten, for example, his editorial  in “ud-Dawah” magazine (one of the five monthly publications of Markaz ud-Dawah wal-Irshad, the predecessor of the JuD) in May 2001 protesting the U.S.’s designation of the LeT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.  Saeed wrote in that editorial:

We believe that the U.S.’s designation of Lashkar-e-Taiba as a terrorist organization will have no impact on us.  But we say that if the U.S. thinks we are a terrorist organization, let them place their evidence in front of the public.  We have repeatedly told the U.S. that it is welcome to present whatever evidence it has against Lashkar-e-Taiba in an independent international forum.

We now reiterate our appeal.  We will prove to the world who the real terrorists are — India, the U.S., Russia and Israel, or the mujahideen.  [Editorial, Majallah ud-Dawah, May 2001]

To be fair, Hafiz Saeed spins so many stories on a daily basis, he’d be hard-pressed to keep up with them all.  And as for Prime Minister Sharif, his “zero tolerance” on terrorism has zero credibility.

 

Read full story · Comments are closed

Stepping up on Afghanistan

India must use its good offices to ensure that the U.S. and Afghanistan sign a bilateral security agreement.

If the world was in need of a preview of things to come in a post-2014 Afghanistan, it got one on Friday.  A Taliban attack on a popular Lebanese restaurant in Kabul claimed 21 lives. Those killed included the International Monetary Fund’s chief for Afghanistan, a senior political official at the UN and a British candidate in the upcoming elections for the European parliament.

The insurgency in Afghanistan has claimed the lives of many of its citizens as well as those of NATO’s security forces.  But as the New York Times notes, attacks against foreign soft targets have been relatively less frequent.  The Kabul Hotel Inter-Continental was attacked in 2011; U.S. and Indian embassies have been hit in Kabul and in other parts of Afghanistan.  The more recent attacks have involved operations with the use of suicide bombers to breach perimeter security followed by commando-style assaults with the use of RPGs and assault rifles.

The Taliban have historically relied on suicide attacks against Western military targets, but the use of commando-style assaults in and around Kabul may point to a collaboration with Pakistan-sponsored groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba, loosely referred to as the “Kabul Attack Network.”

The goal, ultimately, is to weaken the will of the West to remain in Afghanistan after 2014.  The U.S. and NATO winding down operations in Afghanistan will undoubtedly create a perilous security situation in that country.  Afghan president Hamid Karzai has refused to enter into a status of forces agreement with the U.S., even as the Afghan National Army remains ill-equipped to deal with a raging insurgency coupled with terrorist assaults on the capital.

Mr. Karzai is throwing caution to the wind by tying the signing of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to the U.S. facilitating “peace talks” with the Taliban.  He may get neither.  The U.S.’s ability to facilitate a negotiation with the Taliban remains in question, particularly when the Taliban and their sponsors in Pakistan have been working towards the goal of ensuring a total exit of U.S. and allied forces from Afghanistan all along.  Mr. Karzai, whose presidency ends in April 2014, may have little to lose, but the burdens of his action or inaction will be borne by Afghanistan’s future governments.

Meanwhile, anyone in New Delhi still under the delusion that events in Afghanistan have no bearing on the security of India would do well to reach for their history books.  It is precisely the sort of Pakistan-supported, Taliban-operated environment that could prevail in a post-2014 Afghanistan that allowed for India’s surrender of Maulana Masood Azhar (who was languishing in an Indian jail) in Kandahar in exchange for passengers hijacked onboard IC-814 in 1999.

As a result of our capitulation, Azhar returned to Pakistan to regroup members of the terrorist group Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and formed the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in 2000.  A year later, JeM attacked the Indian parliament, killing 12 civilians.  Our members of parliament, rather miraculously, escaped unharmed.

A similar situation may present itself when the U.S. departs Afghanistan.  Although many of us have called for India to deploy hard power in Afghanistan, or at least play a more active role in training and supplying weapons to Afghan security forces, New Delhi has chosen to only limit its involvement to economy and institution-building.  Laudable endeavors undoubtedly, but insufficient to ensure the security of India and her interests in that country.

India has already rebuffed Mr. Karzai’s request for weaponry during his December 2013 visit.  But if India is disinclined to deploy hard power in Afghanistan, it must, at the very least, ensure that a U.S. security presence remains in the country to prevent it from being engulfed in yet another civil war that could render twelve years of development and progress to naught.

Indeed, India is most uniquely positioned — as a friend to both the U.S. and Afghanistan — to use its good offices to ensure that a version of the BSA agreeable to both Afghanistan and the U.S. is signed.  Almost every other country is viewed with suspicion by either DC or Kabul.  Last week, U.S. Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan-Pakistan visited India to discuss the furture of Afghanistan.  U.S. intelligence officials also met an Indian delegation led by Joint Intelligence Chief Ajit Lal to urge India’s influence with Mr. Karzai to conclude the BSA.

There is no doubt that India is in the midst of domestic political upheaval.  The economy is sagging and political stewardship is found wanting in almost every aspect of governance.  However, facilitating a status of forces agreement between Afghanistan and the U.S. must become a national security priority for India.

A U.S.-Afghanistan BSA cannot prevent attacks such as the one this past Friday, but it may stave off a total collapse of the state to the Taliban.  Ultimately, it is simply not in India’s interests to see Afghanistan relapse into the laboratory of terrorism that it once was under Pakistan’s influence. (And on a separate note, New Delhi’s assistance in facilitating a BSA could also demonstrate that both India and the U.S. are committed to putting the very unseemly squabble over Devyani Khobragade behind them).

Read full story · Comments { 0 }

U.S. hearings on the Lashkar-e-Taiba

Convergence of perceptions augurs well for Indo-US counter-terrorism cooperation.

The U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing on June 12 on “Protecting the Homeland Against Mumbai-Style Attacks and the Threat from Lashkar-e-Taiba.”  As a precursor to the hearing, Peter King, chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, remarked that “The LeT is a terror proxy of Pakistan’s [ISI], which provides LeT with a safe haven and funding to train and prepare for terrorist attacks…”  Elected representatives of the U.S. would have hesitated in making such admissions even a decade ago, for fear of embarrassing Pakistan.

The LeT ceased to be an India-specific terror outfit after 26/11; its deliberate targeting of U.S., Western and Israeli citizens during the attacks in Mumbai meant that its orientation was now beyond targets only in India.  Thus, the convergence of common threat perceptions augurs well for Indo-U.S. cooperation on counter-terrorism and on the threats posed by the Lashkar-e-Taiba.  Salient excerpts from the USHOR testimonials follow.

Stephen Tankel on the LeT training Westerners:

LeT has long had a policy of training Westerners. The majority of them are members of the Pakistani and Kashmir diasporas in the U.K., but the group has been training Americans since 2000.

The first Americans known to have trained with LeT were from Virginia and were part of a coterie of would-be jihadists that ultimately became known as the Virginia Jihad Network. Sajid Mir, the commander in charge of overseas operatives, arranged for several of them to provide assistance to a British LeT operative who traveled to the U.S. on multiple occasions from 2002-2003 to procure military gear for the group.

Precisely what LeT or elements within it planned to do with this information is unknown, though they clearly were interested in both surveillance and expanding the group’s networks in the U.S. In 2005, two men from Atlanta Georgia with ties to the ‘Toronto 18’ as well as to a British Pakistani
who acted as a talent spotter for LeT identified possible targets for a terrorist attack in the U.S.

LeT has trained others living in America since then, none more famous than Daood Gilani, who took the name David Coleman Headley in 2006 to help facilitate his reconnaissance trips in Mumbai and elsewhere for the group. He joined LeT in February 2002, participating in the Daura-e-Suffa that month. In August 2002 he went through the Daura-e-Aama and then in April 2003 the Daura-e-Khasa, LeT’s three-month guerrilla warfare training program….

Given the benefits Headley provided to the group, it is reasonable to assume LeT may have increased its efforts to recruit and train other Westerners or to find ways for Pakistani members to acquire citizenship or residency in Western countries. [USHOR]

Christine Fair on the re-branding of the LeT as a charitable organization, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), and continued support from the Pakistani MJC:

To facilitate LeT’s pro-state message countering that of the various Deobandi organizations operating in Pakistan and against Pakistanis (e.g. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Pakistani Taliban), Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and the armed force’s Interservices Public Relations appear to direct Pakistani and international media to cover the ostensible relief efforts of JuD and its other alias, Falah Insaniat Foundation (e.g. during Pakistan’s 2005 earthquake and the 2010 monsoon-related flood). The media coverage of this humanitarian work seemed far in excess of the actual relief activities conducted. Subsequent research has shown that the organization did not provide the relief that the various media proclaimed. In essence, this media coverage handed the organization a public relations boon they did not deserve.

In survey work that my colleagues and I have conducted in Pakistan, we have found that the various state and non-state efforts to rebrand LeT as JuD in Pakistan have been successful. During survey pretesting in Pakistan in 2011, we found that Pakistani respondents viewed the two organizations as being quite distinct and engaging in different activities with the latter being seen more often as providing public services.

As I argued in 2011, this strategy is important. By fostering public support for the organization at home, the Pakistani state can resist pressure from the United States and others to work against the organization. Under these varied guises, LeT/JuD can continue to recruit, raise funds and support its message of jihad against the “external kuffar” such as the Indians, Americans, Israelis and so forth. The continued official investment in the organization and expanding public presence suggests that the Pakistani state is ever more dependent upon this proxy for both domestic and foreign policy requirements. [USHOR]

And finally, Jonah Blank:

On the issue of dealing with a Mumbai-style attack, one thing we can do is take a lesson from the citizens of both Mumbai and Boston. The reason the attacks in these cities were so jarring was that they stripped away the illusion of safety. A few weeks ago, however, the citizens of Boston confronted an unspeakable evil– not with panic but with quiet, rock-solid resolve. That’s what the citizens of Mumbai did in 2008– indeed, at leas t half a dozen times in recent years. Unfortunately, that is what other citizens, in the U.S. as well as elsewhere, will be called on to do in the future.

The Mumbai attack had special meaning for me: I used to live in Mumbai, just a few blocks from the site of most of the attacks. I used to buy American newspapers from the Taj bookshop, stop by the Leopold Cafe for a cold beer, watch a movie at the Metro Cinema, take trains from the terminal that locals still call by its colonial-era initials of “VT.”

One of the victims of the Mumbai attack was a friend of mine. He was man without whom I wouldn’t have been able to conduct my ethnographic fieldwork. He was an elderly Muslim cleric, easily identifiable as such by his white beard and skullcap– but the gunmen still shot him at close range. [USHOR]

These admissions in earnest would have been unthinkable even a decade ago in a Congressional hearing.  The U.S. may be withdrawing from Afghanistan in 2014, but its threat perceptions are rapidly converging with India’s.  This is important at a time when the Pakistani establishment appears to be pitting its frankensteins against each other.

 

Read full story · Comments { 4 }