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A Statement of Intent

Reviewing Mr. Modi’s visit to the U.S. and U.S.-India security cooperation.

To say that Mr. Modi’s first visit to the U.S. as prime minister attracted considerable attention from India’s media would be the understatement of the year.  New York City and Washington, D.C. were abound with media personalities, politicians, and supporters and protesters alike.  In his four-day visit to the U.S., Mr. Modi attended and addressed the United Nations General Assembly, met with business and political leaders, addressed a large rally at New York’s historic Madison Square Garden, co-authored an opinion piece in the Washington Post with U.S. President Barack Obama, and held formal consultations with Mr. Obama and members of his administration.

However, despite the pomp and circumstance, formal consultations between Mr. Modi’s contingent and the Obama administration did not yield substantive results in defense and security.  The India-U.S. Defence Framework, which is due to expire in 2015, is still in the process of being negotiated between the two governments and has not yet been renewed.  The U.S.-India Joint Statement merely signaled a general desire to renew the framework, while also committing to expand political-military dialog to include defense licensing and cooperation.

No new defense deals were signed during the visit.  Although the sale of Chinook heavy-lift helicopters and Apache attack helicopters are being discussed between India and the U.S., the negotiations are clearly not a point where the deal could be signed.  Further, surprisingly little was mentioned on U.S.-India cooperation in a post-2014 Afghanistan, even as the U.S. and NATO concluded security agreements on force levels with the new unity government in Kabul.  The departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan is a cause for concern for India and has direct national security implications.  India’s previous government shied away from arming and equipping Afghanistan’s armed forces, but positions of old need not preclude the new government from working with the U.S. to identify areas where India can substantively contribute to securing Afghanistan.

None of this necessarily means that Mr. Modi’s visit was a failure.  It is clear that Mr. Modi views relations with the U.S. as being vital to India’s security and progress and that he has a vision for future cooperation between the two countries.  However, Mr. Modi has only been in office for four months; it will take him and his government time to translate vision into action.  But if the India-U.S. Joint Declaration is anything to go by, it serves as positive statement of intent for future cooperation between the U.S. and India.  The statement reaffirms the commitment to fully implement the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, and specifically addresses the need for further dialog on the issue of supplier-side liability — where India is a victim of its own self-inflicted wounds — paving the way for U.S.-built nuclear plants in India.

The renewed commitment to cooperate on disrupting terrorist groups is also a positive.  Contrary to some media reports, this was not the first India-U.S. joint statement signaling an intent to cooperate against terror groups (including Lashkar-e-Taiba), nor was it the first joint statement to call on Pakistan to bring those responsible for 26/11 to justice.  Indeed previous joint statements by Dr. Manmohan Singh and Mr. Obama articulated similar objectives.  This was, however, the first time that other criminal and terrorist groups – ISIL, al-Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammad, D-Company and the Haqqani Network – were specifically called out.  It bodes well for future India-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation that the U.S. Department of Treasury today announced further sanctions against Fazl ur-Rehman, leader of the Harakat ul-Mujahideen, and against two Pakistani individuals for providing financial support to Lashkar-e-Taiba.

While previous joint statements had quite generally alluded to the need to promote freedom of navigation in accordance with UNCLOS, this was the first time that the South China Sea was specifically referenced, as were the calls to resolve territorial and maritime disputes through “peaceful means.”  A less-hesitant articulation on the part of India is welcome, since China doesn’t seem particularly placated by the weak and deliberately-vague positions of old anyway.

India is also faced with tremendous human security challenges as the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies target ISIL positions in Syria and Iraq.  Indeed, despite the thousands evacuated earlier this year, many Indian citizens still continue to reside in Iraq (including some potentially illegally) and are vulnerable to being trapped in an area of active conflict or held hostage by ISIL.  In this regard, the stated intention to cooperate on responding to the needs of those stranded in conflict zones is encouraging.

The U.S.-India joint statement was also unusually strong on Iran, calling on it to comply with UNSC-imposed obligations and cooperate fully with the IAEA.  One wonders what the Iranians make of the language in the joint statement and Mr. Modi’s meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu on Sunday.  Perhaps some quiet diplomacy is needed with the Iranians.

Ultimately, the joint statement augurs well for U.S.-India ties, but operationalizing many of the commitments outlined in the statement will require sustained political stewardship at the highest levels of government in New Delhi and Washington, D.C.  It should serve as a warning to both governments that similarly visionary statements left much unrealized as a result of both the Obama administration’s preoccupation with domestic issues as well as the UPA’s feckless and ineffectual leadership.

In order to overcome the possibility of a relapse, Richard Fontaine’s policy brief for the Center for a New American Society recommends that each government designate a “high-level relationship owner,” suggesting that the U.S. vice president or a senior cabinet-level official for the U.S., and the National Security Advisor for India could play such a role.  It is a recommendation worthy of consideration in New Delhi and D.C.

 

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Getting India’s priorities right

Does it matter if Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan are called off?

The government of India has cancelled the proposed Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan as a result of Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India, Abdul Basit, meeting with Hurriyat leaders.  The meetings took place apparently despite Indian warnings to Mr. Basit that Pakistan could choose to engage in dialog with either India or the separatists, but not with both.  It is possible that new red lines are being drawn on what India considers unacceptable engagement by Pakistani politicians and diplomats.  Reaction to India’s response has been mixed; some have called it an overreaction, while others believe India’s response was justified.

But whether India’s decision was an overreaction or a justified response is of no real relevance.  India and Pakistan hold such divergent and irreconcilable positions on Kashmir that a resolution seems almost next to impossible as things stand today.  For India this matters little, as a status-quoist state in a position of advantage in every area of contention vis-à-vis Pakistan on Kashmir.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has a problem.  As Christine Fair rightly notes in her book Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Pakistan is “revisionist, or anti-status quo, in that it desires to bring all of the disputed territory of Kashmir under its control, including the portion currently governed by India.”  Pakistan’s problem though, is that there exists a significant and ever-increasing disparity between its ends and means.  Its military campaigns to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from India have failed with increasing decisiveness in each successive attempt.  India has also successfully thwarted – though at a significant cost – Pakistan’s sub-conventional war in Jammu & Kashmir.

In short, Pakistan’s attempts at resolving the Kashmir dispute through violent means have failed.  Pakistan is therefore left with the only option of negotiation through diplomacy.  But Pakistan’s leaders, present and past, have built a narrative around J&K that allows no scope for nuance, negotiation or compromise.  The resulting public sentiment in Pakistan is that it is unlikely to be satisfied with anything short of India handing Kashmir over to Pakistan on a silver platter.  And that is hardly going to happen.

It doesn’t matter how many whitepapers and non-papers are written and circulated about potential solutions to J&K.  Optimism about their viability isn’t shared by many beyond the confines of Track-II moots in which they are enthusiastically presented.  Ultimately, Pakistan cannot demand anything less than a total surrender of Jammu & Kashmir and India cannot (and will not) give Pakistan what it wants.

This is not at all to advocate a total cessation of dialog with Pakistan.  There is benefit to be derived from continued dialog on ancillary issues such as liberalizing trade and visa regimes.  As far as one can tell, India has only cancelled FS-level talks scheduled for August 25 in Islamabad, not shut the door on future opportunities for talks between the two governments.

Indeed, even as news of the cancelled August 25 talks hogged the limelight, state-run gas utilities from India and Pakistan appear to be in advanced talks for exporting gas from India to Pakistan via a pipeline from Jalandhar to Lahore.  Operationalizing such a project would be significant, considering our troubled histories.  India can continue to pursue these and other pragmatic initiatives with Pakistan, but there are more pressing foreign policy matters that demand India’s attention than its western neighbor.

For India, Pakistan is not a foreign policy priority but a national security threat, given its continued use of terrorism against the Indian homeland and Indian interests abroad.  Dealing with such a threat requires a different set of objectives, actors and intended outcomes.  Currently, those actors do not reside in the Ministry of External Affairs, but in other ministries and agencies of the Indian government.  If India is to expend significant time and effort on Pakistan, it will be better served if they are spent in the pursuit of means to mitigate the threats to India’s national security emanating from that country.

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Namaste, India

Implications to India of Britain’s alleged telecommunications spy base.

The Register reports on Britain’s covert cyber surveillance program in the Middle East.  The report is unconfirmed and there’s really no way to verify the veracity of any of the Register‘s claims, but it does make for interesting reading.  The report claims that Britain’s submarine Internet cable surveillance program is based out of Muscat, Oman (at Seeb station).  It further claims that “probes” are installed on optical cable networks belonging to two British telecommunications heavyweights — BT and Vodafone, thus allowing snooped data to be accessed by cyber-surveillance personnel in the UK.

According to documents revealed by Edward Snowden to journalists including Glenn Greenwald among others, the intelligence agency annually pays selected companies tens of millions of pounds to run secret teams which install hidden connections which copy customers’ data and messages to the spooks’ processing centres. The GCHQ-contracted companies also install optical fibre taps or “probes” into equipment belonging to other companies without their knowledge or consent. Within GCHQ, each company has a special section called a “Sensitive Relationship Team” or SRT. [The Register]

This is particularly interesting because two of the four eastbound submarine cables from Seeb station in Muscat (GIBS and FLAG FALCON), provide backbone connectivity to western India via Mumbai (wild guess, probably at Prabhadevi).  This map will better illustrate the route of the eastern half of Seeb station’s connectivity.  The report alleges that BT and Vodafone are two top earners of secret payments from Britain’s SIGINT organization, GCHQ.   Lest we forget, India represents Vodafone’s largest customer base and the company’s second-largest country in terms of data traffic.

This begs the question: if any of this is true, just how badly compromised is India’s Internet and telecommunications data if the integrity of two of its ingress and egress points is in question?  The Luddites among us, I’m sure, look on with barely-concealed glee.

 

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Urdunama: Ghazwa-e-Hind

On May 5, 2014, Lashkar-e-Taiba’s leader Hafiz Saeed chastised Pakistan’s GEO Group, accusing it of representing India and favoring India’s views against Pakistan.  He then proceeded to write an op-ed in the very same group’s Urdu newspaper, Jang, two weeks later on the occasion of the anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests.  In his op-ed, Saeed warned Pakistan’s political leadership of India’s enmity with Pakistan and urged them to exercise caution in dealing with the new Indian government.

Excerpts follow:

India conducted its May 18, 1974 nuclear tests a mere 93 miles away from the Pakistani border.  These nuclear tests were conducted within a few years of East Pakistan having been lost.  After the 1971 victory, Indira Gandhi stated that the Two Nation Theory as a credible concept now lay somewhere at the bottom of the Bay of Bengal.

But why did India conduct nuclear tests even after it had successfully managed to dismember Pakistan?  The truth is India accumulated nuclear weapons and missiles not because it harbors any good intentions towards its neighbors, but because it wishes to dismember them.  Pakistan, by contrast, has only pursued nuclear weapons for self-defense.   Nuclear technology is essential to Pakistan for two reasons.

One, India to this day has not accepted the reality of Pakistan.  It opposes the integrity and raison d’être of the Pakistani state.   India is an enemy of Pakistan and Islam on political, religious and societal lines.  The concept of “Akhand Bharat” is but a manifestation of the religious, political and militant extremism of India’s leaders.  India’s leaders harbor the same ill-will towards Pakistan today as they did in 1947 or 1971.  Nuclear weapons are thus needed to protect Pakistan’s independence and sovereignty.

Two, Pakistan is a developing country and is confronted with many challenges, including an energy crisis.  We are now also faced with critical water shortages as a result of India’s “water terrorism” against us.  With the help of nuclear energy, Pakistan can hope to address critical shortages in energy supply in Pakistan.

Sixteen years ago, the ruling BJP party threatened to seize Azad Kashmir and annihilate Pakistan after they tested their nuclear weapons.  The BJP is back in power in India.  Narendra Modi is now the prime minister and most Indians appear to be enthusiastic at the ascendance of this extremist leader.

We appeal to Pakistan’s leaders that they should not forget that India’s attitude towards Pakistan has not changed in the 16 years since the nuclear tests .  India’s attitude towards Pakistan is one of hatred and enmity. Our past leaders were prepared to sacrifice Pakistan’s independence and sovereignty in the quest for peace with India.  They deviated from our long-standing official position on Kashmir.  But what did Pakistan get in return from India?  Enmity, sabotage, terrorism, water aggression and hatred.

The clearest evidence of India’s antipathy towards Pakistan is the most recently-concluded elections in India, which were contested exclusively on the basis of hatred towards Pakistan.  These elections have revealed India’s farcical claims of secularism and friendship with Pakistan. BJP’s agenda involves the abrogation of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status, replacement of the Babri Masjid with a Ram temple and the repatriation of all Hindus living abroad to India.

We therefore ask Pakistan’s political leaders to reassess their priorities in dealing with India.  Optimism is perhaps a good thing, but being delusional isn’t. In international relations, delusional thinking can lead to the downfall of countries.  It is important, therefore, for our government to clearly identify our enemy and understand its aims and motivations. [جنگ]

The MJC appears to be working overtime on account of the new leadership in India.  We also understand that Saeed has scheduled a Ghazwa-e-Hind (Conquest of India) conference on June 5 in Rawalakot, PoK, with the usual suspects Maulana Saifullah Khalid and Nassar Javed likely to be in attendance. (h/t @TarekFatah)

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