Warning: Creating default object from empty value in /nfs/c03/h04/mnt/56080/domains/filtercoffee.nationalinterest.in/html/wp-content/themes/canvas/functions/admin-hooks.php on line 160
Tag Archives | isi

After Osama bin Laden

Eight points to consider.

Osama bin-Laden has been killed.  U.S. president Barack Obama made the announcement over an hour ago.  We have more questions than answers about the nature of the operation that led to his killing and what cooperation, if any, was received from other governments.  Some points for us to consider:

  1. The fact that bin Laden was killed outside Abbottabad (75 miles from Islamabad) is significant.  Abbottabad is reported to house several retired Pakistani army and intelligence officers.
  2. Mr. Obama’s mention of President Zardari, and not Gen. Kayani/DG-ISI Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha is equally significant.  We know that the operation was in the works since August 2010, and gained momentum over the last six weeks.  It is also important to note Mr. Obama’s  mention that the operation was entirely executed by the U.S. — this was not a joint operation with Pakistani special-ops forces.  It is not clear at what point the Americans informed the Pakistanis.  If it turns out that the Pakistani civil administration was informed days or weeks before the operation, this is a significant victory for the civil administration over the military-jihadi complex (MJC).  If the Zardari government was informed ex post facto, it will still affect civil-military relations in Pakistan, but on a relatively lesser scale.
  3. We cannot read too much into President Obama thanking Pakistan for its cooperation.  The U.S. president was speaking in general terms — lest we forget, there is still a battle raging in Afghanistan for which the U.S. requires Pakistan’s assistance.  There was not much else Mr. Obama could have said about Pakistan’s duplicity.
  4. Given the fact that U.S. Navy SEALs traveled from Afghanistan to Pakistan and executed the operation, it is likely that some level of Pakistani cooperation — whether direct, or indirect — was required.  If it turns out that cooperation was provided by Pakistan’s FIA and not the ISI, this is again, a significant moment in civil-military relations in Pakistan.
  5. If, in the remote possibility, any assistance was provided by Pakistan’s military/ISI, it only means that Osama bin Laden had become expendable to them.  The torch had been passed.
  6. Expect the battle between the civil administration and its goons, and the Pakistani military and its goons to play out openly in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  This will also effect the U.S.’s ability to move men and resources from Pakistan’s tribal areas  into Afghanistan.  This can be significantly consequential to the U.S.’s war in Afghanistan.
  7. The MJC will look to reassert itself as quickly and as decisively as possible.  It will set its sights on high-value targets in Pakistan, Afghanistan or even India.
  8. Critically, the Indian government needs to guard itself against possible terrorist activity in mainland India. ISI or al-Qaeda inspired attacks on Indian soil in the immediate future cannot be ruled out.  India is perhaps the most vulnerable target for the Pakistani MJC to counter-punch the Zardari government, which is ostensibly engaged in a “peace process” with New Delhi.

 

Read full story · Comments { 10 }

Link Digest: July 18, 2010

l’affaire Lahore.

Your weekly news digest:

  • The ISI…controlled and coordinated [26/11] from beginning to end“:  G.K. Pillai’s interview with Indian Express on J&K, Naxalism and 26/11.
  • It was the Pakistanis who deviated from the summit’s agenda: Vir Sanghvi stands up for G.K. Pillai after some journalists pilloried the Home Secretary for his statements on the eve of the S.M. Krishna — S.M. Qureshi talks.
  • Pakistan’s Urdu press reacts.  “No India-Pakistan talks can produce a result without Kashmir being resolved” (Ausaf); “One more India-Pakistan dialog drama — May God  not compell us to use our atomic bomb” (Nawa-i-Waqt); “Sensitivity from the Indian side is the need of the hour” (Jang); “Why did India agree to the agenda and send S.M. Krishna if he had no mandate?” (Express).
  • Ignore. With Contempt: Sound advice from B. Raman on how New Delhi should react to S.M. Qureshi’s jibes.
  • Can we talk?: Thomas Friedman says CNN was wrong to fire Octavia Nasr for condoling the death of Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (who many consider the spiritual leader of the Hizballah).
Read full story · Comments { 0 }

Syed Salahuddin’s ultimatum

With or without you.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen’s ameer Syed Salahuddin issued an ultimatum to the Pakistani establishment: support us in Kashmir, or pursue peace talks with India. One or the other — not both. Roznama Ausaf’s editorial advices the Pakistani government:

Syed Salahuddin asks of our government where its loyalties lie —  “if Pakistan intends to pursue friendship with India, then let it stop advocating on behalf of Kashmiris.” Our leaders must understand that rekindling talks with India will not result in peace with that nation, but with it renouncing its support for Kashmir’s independence. [روزنامہ اوصاف]

The ultimatum itself is meaningless, given that the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is a fully owned and operated entity of the ISI and that Mr. Salahuddin has lived in Pakistan for well over ten years. The group’s role in the on-going security situation in J&K is an act of direct provocation from Pakistan’s military-jihadi complex. The Indian government would do well to consider to what extent it can afford to “insulate dialog from terror,” given the structure of the ongoing India-Pakistan talks and the probability of further state-sponsored attacks in J&K, and perhaps even in major Indian cities.

Read full story · Comments { 0 }

The War on Amrullah Saleh

How many journalists does it take to fix an Afghan light bulb?

Ever since Amrullah Saleh, the head of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) resigned after a Taliban attack on the Afghan Peace Jirga, the Pakistani establishment has gone to great lengths to malign the former intelligence official.  This insidious campaign aims to both target Mr. Saleh’s credibility and restore a Pakistan-favorable narrative in Kabul’s corridors of power.

The News was one of the first media outlets to attack Mr. Saleh:

Amrullah Saleh has taken up the full-time job to malign Pakistan on one end while providing all sorts of assistance to terrorists to step up activities on the soil of Pakistan on the other. He throughout had been in league with Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to destabilise Pakistan but has been recently ousted by Afghan President Hamid Karzai due to his dubious role in the affairs of the state. Amrullah has also assumed the task of creating difficulties for the Afghan administration.  [The News]

Rahimullah Yusufzai, editor of The News‘s sister publication, Jang, kept up the heat on Mr. Saleh:

Amrullah Saleh regards Pakistan and the ISI as Afghanistan’s enemy number one, but has no proof to support his claims.  If Mr. Saleh believes that the ISI is responsible for the ills in his nation, why hasn’t he produced any proof to the effect? Amrullah Saleh is a Tajik, whose alliances lay with Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani — both of whom were rabidly anti-ISI….[S]aleh is anti-Pashto, has tried to give voice to the Northern Alliance, and holds Pakistan responsible for all the problems Afghanistan faces.  [جنگ]

But no propaganda campaign is complete without input from former ISS Director, Dr. Shireen Mazari, who as editor of The Nation, opined thus:

It is in this connection that the story in Nawai Waqt regarding RAW hiring the ex-Afghan Chief Amrullah Saleh, who resigned recently and spouted venom against Pakistan’s ISI In the now infamous Sunday Times story, must be taken seriously by the concerned organisations in Pakistan. After all, as the Afghan intelligence chief Saleh would have had access to Pakistan-US information sharing of a sensitive nature, which could prove valuable to India in its ongoing covert operations in Pakistan. [The Nation]

That Amrullah Saleh is a Tajik is irrelevant.  When a country’s intelligence and military establishment acts as chief patron to a group that unleashed unspeakable horror in a neighboring country, it is only understandable that the citizens of that country harbor resentment towards the patron.

There is deep concern in Rawalpindi that Mr. Saleh, while not being constrained by official capacity, might take the war to Pakistan and reveal things that ‘Pindi wouldn’t care to have disclosed in public domain.  The attacks, therefore, should be considered as preemptive strikes against anything that Mr. Saleh will likely reveal against the Pakistani establishment. After all, when an aggrieved intelligence official speaks, solid matter is bound to hit the air circulating equipment.

Read full story · Comments { 2 }