Tag Archives | NATO

Threading the needle

By Rohan Joshi on July 3, 2012 in America, Foreign Policy, Pakistan

What the U.S.’s “Apolo-jee” to Pakistan really means.

There is jubilation among Pakistan’s social media commentators on the apology (hereinafter referred to as “apolo-jee”) apparently tendered by the U.S. to Pakistan on account of the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers last November at the Salala checkpost near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.  If these narratives are to be believed, then the U.S. has, after months of resistance, accepted culpability for the murder of the Pakistani soldiers and apologized to the Pakistani government for its transgression.

Moreover, little David, financially bankrupt and increasingly running out of room to maneuver, stood up nonetheless to Goliath; and would you believe it, Goliath backed down.  It’s a beautiful little tale, and one that will no doubt leave many teary-eyed.  But really, what did the U.S. say today that it hasn’t said on several occasions since November 26, 2011?

U.S. Secretary of State Hilliary Clinton’s office released this statement to the press:

This morning, I spoke by telephone with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar.

I once again reiterated our deepest regrets for the tragic incident in Salala last November. I offered our sincere condolences to the families of the Pakistani soldiers who lost their lives. Foreign Minister Khar and I acknowledged the mistakes that resulted in the loss of Pakistani military lives. We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military. We are committed to working closely with Pakistan and Afghanistan to prevent this from ever happening again.

As I told the former Prime Minister of Pakistan days after the Salala incident, America respects Pakistan’s sovereignty and is committed to working together in pursuit of shared objectives on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. [U.S. Department of State]

Let’s examine this “apolo-jee,” shall we? First, a reiteration of a regret does not an apology amounting to acceptance of culpability make. Second, apparently, both Pakistan and the U.S. acknowledged the “mistakes” made that resulted in the loss of Pakistan’s military lives.  But whose mistakes? Vague. Third, “we are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistan military”? Losses? What losses, and suffered where? The Pakistani armed forces have a rich and storied history of suffering losses, as anyone in India can tell you.  Pakistan’s own politicians, military officials and commentators are quick to remind the world that it has lost 40,000 of its finest supporting “America’s War.”  Sec. Clinton’s statement is, therefore, hardly an apology for Salala.

Furthermore, Sec. Clinton’s statements say nothing that the U.S. has not already said about the incident. NATO’s secretary general expressed “regret” a mere two days after the Salala incident.  The outgoing U.S. ambassador to Pakistan regretted the incident too.  In fact, various Obama administration officials had “regretted” the incident about 20 times.  All these apologies were summarily rejected by Pakistan. So pray, why is regret #21 the charm?

The fact of the matter is, Pakistan had put itself in a position whether it could neither back down from a costly confrontation with the U.S., for domestic political reasons, nor continue to impede the U.S., given its economic condition. Both Pakistan and the U.S. had previously attempted to arrive at a settlement, but these negotiations proved inconclusive due to Pakistan’s demand for both an apology, and transit fee of $5,000 per truck that crossed its territory.

Now, if this was a “soft apology,” today’s statement certainly did not say “we’re sorry we killed your soldiers.”  And per the New York Times, Pakistan has agreed to keep the transit fee at its current rate of $250 per truck.  So Pakistan is 0-for-2 in its demands to the U.S., but has nonetheless opened up its on-land supply routes to NATO.  Still feel like David won?

Quite simply, Pakistan had ratcheted up the rhetoric to a point where it couldn’t climb down without losing face. The U.S. had two options — allow Pakistan to continue to squirm, or work out an arrangement with Pakistan to re-open on-land supply routes.  It chose the latter, allowing Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership to step back from the brink without suffering yet another humiliating surrender at the hands of the U.S. Pakistan, for its part, was more than revealed.

If any further clarity was needed, the conspicuous absence of any Difa-e-Pakistan Council crazies, whose leaders had previous organized mass protests and even written an “open letter” to Pakistan’s parliamentarians urging no compromise on reopening supply routes, provides us enough context to the apology that never was.

Read full story · Comments { 10 }

Urdunama: Khula Khat

By Rohan Joshi on April 18, 2012 in Af-Pak, America, Pakistan, Terrorism, Urdunama, World

Jamaat ud-Dawwa’s (JuD’s) leader Hafiz Saeed recently published an “open letter” to Pakistan’s parliament, protesting its decision to restore on-land NATO supply routes and “conditional re-engagement” with the U.S. The pamphlet bears the letterhead of the JuD, but appears to speak on behalf of the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC), further confirming the futility in attempts to distinguish between the two, or indeed between the DPC and the MJC brotherhood.  This “open letter” was brought to light by journalist Omar Quraishi (thanks to @Vikram_Sood for the link) .  The pamphlet was pasted outside one of Karachi’s most upscale stores (اردو).

To the Members of Parliament:

As you are aware, the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) has presented its recommendations on relations with the U.S. and the issue of NATO’s supply lines during the joint parliamentary session on March 20, 2012.  News reports indicate that NATO supply lines are being restored due to U.S. pressure.  It is also allegedly being proposed that taxes on NATO supplies be increased and that 50 per cent of the traffic be transported via rail.

The Difa-e-Pakistan Council has already communicated its thoughts to the Parliament on the above proposals, and would further like to remind the Parliament that:

  1. Parvez Musharraf entered into secret and verbal agreements with the U.S. that ultimately were detrimental to our own security and to the security of our Afghan brothers.  However, if these agreements are now being given formal consent via the Parliament, it sets a very dangerous precedent.
  2. The East India Company had also entered into similar agreements with the Mughal Empire, which resulted in the colonization of India.  If the Parliament accedes to these agreements, Pakistan’s sovereignty will no doubt be compromised.
  3. We must be cognizant of the fact that restoration of on-land access routes to NATO will negatively impact our relations with China.
  4. The bold bipartisan decision to ban NATO supply routes after the Salala incident brought confidence to the people of Pakistan.  However, if these routes were to be reauthorized, it would create confusion and instability in our country.
  5. It is indeed worrying that India is being given on-land access to Afghanistan and West Asia via Pakistan.  In fact, this presents a far greater risk to Pakistan than the restoration of supply routes to NATO. The U.S. and India have recently concluded joint military exercises in Rajasthan.  Granting India route access to Afghanistan via Pakistan and entering into trade agreements with that country present a security threat to Pakistan and risks annoying friendly nations such as China.
  6. We must consider that NATO containers travel through all provinces of Pakistan and have previously been targeted and could be targeted yet again if supply routes are restored.  Thus, the U.S. might use repeated attacks on its trucks as a ruse to invade or establish a military foothold inside Pakistan, claiming a lack of confidence in the Pakistani armed forces’ ability to safeguard their assets.
  7. The U.S. has never honored any of its agreements with Pakistan.  It instead blamed Pakistan for the Salala altercation.  Are we about to endorse these actions, and that too via our own Parliament? Would this happen, Pakistan will be engulfed yet again by the flames of terrorism fanned by the likes of the U.S., NATO and India.

Dear Members of Parliament, we ask that you consider our requests objectively.  We ask that you depart from the tradition of parochial policy-making and think instead of Pakistan’s citizens and its future generations.  If you were to make your decisions against the will of the people of Pakistan, it will hurt the nation and our Afghan brothers.  Please remember that those helping people who burn the Quran and kill our brothers will be accountable for their sins in this life and beyond.  May Allah assist you in doing right by your people.

Your well-wisher,

Hafiz Muhammad Saeed

Ameer, Jamaat ud-Dawwa Pakistan [Source]

The “open letter” is interesting because where India and the U.S. are concerned, the LeT/JuD (unlike other jihadi outfits) has seldom differed with sponsors in Rawalpindi.  However, it would also be nearly impossible for a decision in Pakistan’s parliament to have been concluded on the future of ties with the U.S. and on NATO supply routes without consultation and approval from GHQ.

Effectively, the GHQ is being drawn into making compromises on U.S. demands out of reluctance yet again, as it was at the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in 2001.  It has since pursued a policy of  supporting U.S.-led operations, while covertly attempting to undermine them.  Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj’s antics, the Haqqani network’s activities inside Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden’s discovery in Abbottabad are but examples of Pakistan’s attempts at subversion.

While Rawalpindi might have agreed ostensibly to restore NATO supply routes, it does so out of necessity and with every intention to keep the pressure on the U.S. and allied forces with 2014 in mind.  To that end, it might employ a series of agents to do its bidding. Historically, groups such as the LeT have been primarily been India-focused.  But this might be changing if Rawalpindi is committed to temporary bonhomie with India. The recent attacks by the Taliban in Kabul and not-so-subtle threats in bullet #6 above might be harbingers of a dangerous summer.

Note: Source and additional detail updated based on the pamphlet on the Difa-e-Pakistan Council website.

Read full story · Comments { 15 }

General rhetoric

By Rohan Joshi on December 1, 2011 in Pakistan, United States

Gen. Kayani finds himself in a very unenviable position.

There is palpable anger in the streets of Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi over U.S. airstrikes that killed 24 Pakistani troops last Saturday.  The most powerful man in Pakistan, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani has been forced to swing into damage control mode.  Pakistan’s first haphazard response to the attacks involved closing NATO supply lines and demanding  that the U.S. vacate Shamsi airbase (allegedly used to conduct drone strikes in K-P).  It then withdrew itself from the Bonn conference on Afghanistan.  Then there was a vague attempt to block the BBC and other “Western channels” from broadcasting in Pakistan — a strange threat at best, and one that is unlikely to hurt anyone, except possibly, listeners of the BBC in Pakistan.

Today, Gen Kayani apparently “upped the ante” by declaring that his troops would respond with “full force” to any future aggression by NATO or the U.S.:

“Be assured that we will not let the aggressor walk away easily,” the army chief said in a message for the troops and added that he had “clearly directed that any act of aggression will be responded with full force, regardless of the cost and consequences”.

He believed that the attack could have been retaliated effectively had the communications network not broken down. “Timely decision could not be taken due to breakdown of communication with the affected posts and therefore lack of clarity of situation at various levels, including corps HQ and GHQ.”

Gen Kayani further clarified that the troops could respond on their own, when attacked, without waiting for orders from the command. “I have full trust in your capabilities and resolve,” he stressed. [Dawn]

But this is all meaningless rhetoric for several reasons.  First, Pakistan is not the victim that it is claiming to be, but in fact the aggressor.  It has been reliably reported that it was Pakistan, not the U.S., that fired first, presumably in an attempt to aid the Taliban, which had come under siege from U.S. Special Forces.  This, of course, is not a new occurrence.  The Long War Journal catalogs at least eight occasions of unprovoked cross-border shelling by Pakistani troops in Mohmand Agency since September 2011.

Second, if the Pakistanis could have hit back at NATO or U.S. forces, they would have.  The fact that they didn’t indicates that they couldn’t.  Upon being initially challenged by the Pakistanis, U.S. Special Forces called in close air support from NATO, which proceeded to decimate the aggressors.  This is not an issue of a breakdown in communication between corps HQ and GHQ.  When you’re under attack and taking casualties, you don’t need “permission” from your Chief of Army Staff to defend yourself.

Third, bravado notwithstanding, how can the Pakistani army realistically “respond with full force, regardless of the cost or consequences?” Does Gen. Kayani not expect the U.S. to respond in kind to Pakistani military action? Is Pakistan really that stupid to get into a fight with the U.S. or NATO and trigger an uncontrollable chain of events?

The truth of the matter is that the proverbial noose around the neck of the current Chief of Army Staff is tightening since the humiliation of the Abbottabad raid in May.  Pakistan’s inability to respond to the recent “act of aggression” puts Gen. Kayani in a very unenviable position.  And the more that noose tightens, the more erratic Gen. Kayani’s actions will get.  There are already many Yahyas in Rawalpindi to Kayani’s Ayub. And as a restless nation bays for blood, Kayani is capable of attempting to placate them with little else than bellicose rhetoric.

Given the rather delicate situation that he finds himself in, Gen. Kayani in actuality should be praying for zero confrontation with NATO or U.S. forces in the short-term, rather than welcoming it. For should he find himself in a Salala-like situation in the near future, he might discover that the cost of backing down from another military confrontation with the U.S. outweighs its apparent benefits.

Read full story · Comments { 4 }

Sinnerman, where you gonna run to?

By Rohan Joshi on October 8, 2010 in Urdunama

Roznama Jasarat’s unintentional honesty.

In Roznama Jasarat’s October 8, 2010 cartoon, there’s a palpable feeling of victory over Pakistan recent squabbles with NATO and the U.S.  But in all the excitement at having clipped NATO’s wings (or removed its tusks), the poor little talib in Jasarat’s cartoon appears to be blissfully unaware that he is actually marching off a precipice.  That poor talib could be Pakistan.


 

Read full story · Comments { 1 }