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Tag Archives | nuclear

On Pakistan’s Hatf-IX tests

Should you buy what Pakistan is selling?

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations organization has been trying to sell its citizens, and more importantly, India, on the implications of the country’s successful testing of Hatf-IX/NASR, a nuclear-capable battlefield range ballistic missile.  Dr. Shireen Mazari, formerly Director-General, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, proclaimed that the reality of a tactical weapons capability in Pakistan has effectively check-mated India’s so-called “Cold Start” doctrine.

The argument is that the threat of employing low-yield nuclear weapons against the army will be sufficient to deter India from a conventional military attack.  The Pakistanis are apparently betting that their use of tactical nuclear weapons against advancing Indian forces — possibly, even on Pakistani soil — will not lead to a rapid escalation nor result in massive nuclear retaliation by India because of the relative magnitude and damage caused by the attack.  These are both absurd assumptions.

Under such a scenario, the very fact that the Indian army chose to attack Pakistan, despite its large nuclear arsenal, means that India was calling Pakistan’s bluff and that deterrence had failed.  What is the point of threatening the Indian army with tactical nuclear weapons at such a juncture?  Further, India’s Nuclear Doctrine specifically calls for a “punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor” in the event of “any nuclear attack against India and its forces” (emphasis added).  The Pakistanis, of course, are welcome to interpret the phrase “punitive retaliation” any way they see fit, but I doubt that their curiosity for greater clarity on the term would lead them to provoke India into giving a practical demonstration.

On Hatf-IX/NASR,  a brilliant op-ed by Ejaz Haider in today’s The Express Tribune (LT @d_jaishankar):

In our case, will we be using this weapon system for war fighting against an attacking Indian force on our soil? There can be no other use for such a weapon. If it does come to that, our deterrence would already have failed and I cannot see how use of TNWs will constitute a climb on the escalatory ladder to resurrect it. We are, of course, not even considering how our own troops and population would be exposed to the fallout from a TNW. Neither am I even touching upon the hair-raising issue of command and control of this system dispersed right down to the units and sub-units by the very logic of its deployment and employment.

Meanwhile, why would an adversary not raise the bar after its force is struck with a TNW? This was precisely the folly of strategies that led to the development of sophisticated and more accurate missiles. It was thought that striking and degrading only the enemy’s hard targets would prevent him from an all-out nuclear strike. Someone realised that it was stupid to determine the enemy’s response for him!

Moreover, our deterrence is pegged on NOT fighting a war, i.e., ensuring prevention of war by denying India its conventional advantage. This weapon system is about fighting a war, or supposed employment in case hostilities break out. That makes a mockery of our basic strategic requirement. Are we now going to frame and put the old deterrence on a wall in a drawing room? At the minimum, going for this kind of system reflects a mindset, one of paranoia, which ends up signalling to the adversary the exact opposite of what needs to be signalled — ie we are confident of our deterrent. Instead, we are happily embarked on diluting our deterrent and consider it an outstanding achievement.

But this is not all. There are other troubling questions related to the civil-military imbalance and flawed decision-making to which I shall return in the follow-up. [The Express Tribune]

 

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India debates the nuclear bomb (1991)

A discussion with K Subrahmanyam, Gen. Sundarji, Jaswant Singh, Praful Bidwai, and others.

Rummaging through Indian Express’ archives has unearthed an interesting discussion in India in January 1991, on the merits and demerits of going nuclear and costs associated with such a decision.  Interestingly, the discourse in India at the time was motivated by accounts of Pakistan already possessing a nuclear stockpile;  not the other way around, as some commentators would like the world to believe.  Clearly, AQ Khan’s admission to Kuldip Nayar in at the height of the Brasstacks crisis played a critical role in shaping Indian perceptions of the regional security environment, post 1987.

The seminar, entitled “Nuclear Pakistan and Indian Response,” was sponsored by IDSA and included commentary from K Subrahmanyam, Gen. Sundarji, Jaswant Singh, Gen. Vohra and Praful Bidwai.  Excerpts from Manvendra Singh’s op-ed follow:

Mr. Praful Bidwai expressed doubts as to whether Pakistan was in fact capable of producing nuclear weapons.  He called it a bogey used by many in Delhi, for the sole purpose of justifying India going nuclear.  David Albright’s article in the June (1987) issue of “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists” was heavily quoted by him for the technical aspects of his arguments.

Albright’s article was full of uncertainties, as Mr. RR Subramaniam pointed out in his vociferous rebuttals of Mr. Bidwai, whose claim that Pakistan’s nuclear policy was a response to the 1974 Pokhran test was historically incorrect.  And in fact none of the other participants pointed out to him that ZA Bhutto’s famous (we will eat grass but make a bomb) speech was made in January, 1972 in Multan.

Gen. Sundarji, with his quick-draw tongue, was at his articulately hawkish best.  A specialist in “Deterrence theories,” Gen. Sundarji made a very pertinent point when he stated that simple deterrence, without political engagement leads to overkill, as it did for the Soviet Union.  This was in response to the argument that desire for nuclear weapons in the belief of acting as deterrents can never be satiated, as stockpiles go on rising.  While unequivocally calling for India to go nuclear, he was of the view that diplomatic dialogue has to be encouraged if an overkill situation is to be avoided.

Mr. K Subrahmanyam, the doyen amongst defense specialists, was characteristically blunt and sharp in his analysis. Debunking the argument put forward that an active nuclear policy is grossly expensive, Mr. Subrahmanyam convincingly backed his  thesis that in terms of the value of returns for investments, a nuclear weapons programme is the most effective.  The total amount, he clarified, spent on our nuclear weapons programme is minuscule compared to the overall defence outlay.  Lamenting on the absence of direction and purpose in our nuclear policy, he grimly reminded the participants about the period post-1962, when India went, prostrate before Britain and the United States, desperate for a nuclear umbrella vis-a-vis China, backing Gen. Sundarji’s statement that “weakness is not a virtue.”

Mr. Jaswant Singh, the only active participant from the ranks of politicians (Mr. IK Gujral was largely an observer), created a bit of a ripple amongst the participants when he declared that India had lost the strategic initiative to Pakistan.  He declined to elaborate, saying that it was vital for all to ponder over it.  In all probability, his thesis revolved around the fact that primarily out of our inaction, the internal and external range of India’s maneuverability has shrunk to levels incompatible to India’s status and role in the world.  This is the sum total loss arising out of an absence of clear long-term policy formulation and implementation.

And taking this setback into account, he said, makes it all the more necessary to have permanent bodies like the National Security Council Secretariat.  Active during the period of the National Front government in the formation of the NSC, Mr. Singh stated convincingly that it was imperative for India to have such a specialized decision-making body, given the circumstances that it finds itself in. The shortage of active politicians participating in seminars of such importance is a phenomenon for all Indians to seriously think about.

The decision to go nuclear, or not, rests entirely on the political leadership of India, and which is to a large extent, totally unacquainted with this and related subjects.  In Pakistan,however, it is the military brass that is in control of defence policy-making.  A military in power, directly or indirectly, will always enlarge its arsenal to keep the internal balance of power, psychologically or otherwise, in its favour.  It is therefore natural, no matter how much static exists between Washington and Islamabad, that Gen. [Aslam] Baig will go ahead with increasing and improving Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

In the unlikely event of Pakistani civil leadership initiating moves towards a nuclear treaty with India, Gen. Baig could very easily torpedo the whole process with some populist gimmickry.  A nuclear capability will be an enormous psychological boost for Pakistan’s aims in Afghanistan, Punjab and Kashmir. [Indian Express]

 

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Pakistan’s nuclear weapons

What’s at stake and who should be worried.

Foreign Policy ran a piece by SWJ’s Robert Haddick on recent disclosures about Pakistan’s increasing nuclear arsenal.  Pakistan’s single-minded pursuit of destabilizing the subcontinent should not come as a surprise to those that have followed Pakistan’s weapons program.  However, this article, like many others in the West, perpetuates the notion of an “arms race” in the subcontinent that Pakistan is swept helplessly into.  This blogger finds such narratives very disturbing, and hence the rebuttal.  Mr. Haddick’s first paragraph on Pakistan reads thus:

The most obvious and enduring explanation for the continuing buildup in Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile is the inescapable demographic and economic superiority enjoyed by India. India’s economy is nearly nine times larger than Pakistan’s, it spends 7.6 times more per year on its military and can mobilize 6.8 times as many military-aged males. Absent the arrival of previously unknown trust between the two countries, nuclear weapons are the only way for Pakistan to reassure itself about this unfixable strategic imbalance.

No, the explanation is neither the most obvious, nor enduring.  Because it presupposes and rationalizes the argument that Pakistan must gain strategic parity with India under all circumstances.  This, of course, is misleading because there simply is no reason for a country one-ninth that of India to try and gain parity with it, especially when India has never provoked conflict with it.

Let us also be careful about throwing about numbers on defense spending.  Yes, India does spend considerably more than Pakistan does in absolute numbers.  However, India’s defense spending, firstly, isn’t Pakistan-centric.  And second, when considered as a percentage of GDP, Pakistan’s defense spending is at about 5%, while India’s is below 2.5%.  This does not even factor in the $2 billion the U.S. provided Pakistan in overt military aid, which in and of itself amounts to about 1.2% of Pakistan’s GDP.  That should put Pakistan’s defense “spending” at 6.2% of GDP for FYE11.  And let us not even get into discussions about the misappropriation of aid provided to Pakistan.

Next, the article attempts to draw parallels between Pakistan’s increasing nuclear arsenal and the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement:

The completion of the civil nuclear agreement between Washington and New Dehli was no doubt highly disturbing to Pakistan. With India’s nuclear technology and expertise fungible, the civil nuclear agreement allowed India to divert resources to its military nuclear program. Pakistan likely concluded that it had to respond to a potentially much larger Indian nuclear program at some point in the future.

Again, a very convenient excuse.  No doubt, the civil nuclear deal between India and the U.S. does disturb Pakistan.  But not because it “allows India to divert resources to its military nuclear program” but really because it negates the parity that Pakistan imagines it has with India.

If India really wanted to produce more nuclear weapons than it already has, it can, since it has sufficient fissile material reserves (as opposed to Pakistan).  The fact that India hasn’t weaponized its reserves amply demonstrates that it is committed to maintaining minimum credible deterrence (something that Pakistan has never been committed to).

But here’s the kicker in the article:

The latest round of nuclear news out of Pakistan demonstrates that South Asia has not found a way out of the security dilemma it has long been in.

Excuse me, “South Asia?”  Let us not equate the actions of a rogue state with one that has been a constructive participant of several nonproliferation and disarmament discussions, including the FMCT talks.  Let us not also assume that Pakistan has no option but to add more weapons to its stockpile because of India.  If Pakistan was concerned about deterrence, it should revisit the unfolding of events subsequent to the December 13, 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament and 26/11.

The question that the West must ask is why Pakistan continues to add weapons to its stockpile, especially when their payloads are unlikely to give India any more of a headache than they already do. Mr. Haddick alludes to one aspect of this in his discussions about Iran — but the key here isn’t Iran per se, it is Saudi Arabia.

Additionally, Rawalpindi sees value in portraying Pakistan to be an unstable and irrational state.  An Islamic state teetering on the precipice while adding nuclear weapons to its stockpile quicker than any other nation is bound to attract Washington’s attention — and benevolence.

Pakistan’s most successful industry today is selling its irrationality to the rest of the world.  Rawalpindi is the snake-oil salesman and Washington, the wide-eyed wonder.  The U.S. has doled out billions of dollars to Pakistan since 2001.  How does it know how the money was spent, and if it ever made it to its intended recipients? What has the U.S. received from Pakistan after 10 years of appeasement?  The answer to these questions should worry D.C. more than it should New Delhi.

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Sensationalistan

Where the mind is without fear and the head is buried in the sand.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published its report on China’s nuclear forces ( pdf).  This is an annual report, and part of a series that the Bulletin publishes on the nuclear forces of other powers.  Nothing particularly earth-shattering for those that have been following China’s nuclear program, but I bring this up because of this little extract, pertaining to India:

In a section describing Chinese-Indian relations, the 2010 Pentagon report stated that China is using the more advanced and survivable DF-21s to replace DF-4s to improve regional deterrence. This was picked up by the Press Trust of India, which mistakenly reported that according to the Pentagon, China has moved advanced longer range CSS-5 [the DF-21 NATO designation] missiles close to the border with India. Not surprisingly, the report triggered dramatic news articles in India, including rumors that the Indian Strategic Forces Command was considering or had already moved nuclear-capable missile units north toward the Chinese border.

The Pentagon report, however, said nothing about moving DF-21 missiles close to the Indian border.  Instead,it described the apparent near-completion of China’s replacement of DF-4 missiles with DF-21 missiles at two army base areas in Hunan and Qinghai provinces,a transition that has been under way for two decades. The two deployment areas are each more than 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) from the Indian border. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]

The Press Trust of India got wind of this “story” on August 17, and without anyone validating the statements in the article to the source,  announced:

China has moved new advanced longer range CSS-5 missiles close to the borders with India and developed contingency plans to shift airborne forces at short notice to the region, according to Pentagon.

Not to be outdone, Asian Age added in its own masala, about Agni-II being moved to the border to counter these imagined Chinese moves.

In the wake of a recent Pentagon report that China is moving advanced CSS-5 ballistic missiles to areas close to the Sino-Indian border, New Delhi is clearly taking no chances.

The government is also reportedly moving the strategic Agni-II missile inducted earlier to areas near the Chinese border. These have a range of around 2,000 km.

Asian Age ran its story despite the fact that it received official denial from the Army that missile units had not been moved to Eastern Command.  “News makers” indeed, quite literally.  The folks at the Bulletin were probably being kind by describing Indian media reaction as a “mistake.”  This is borderline warmongering.

Pity,  no one stopped to read what was written in the U.S. Department of Defense’s publication, or sought any clarification on what China was doing.  Had they done so, it would have become apparent that all the Chinese were doing was replacing their old liquid-fueled DF-4s with solid-fueled DF-21s in Hunan and Qinghai provinces (about 1,500 km from the Indian border).  The only reason the DoD mentioned India in this context was the upgrade was partly motivated by China’s desire to “improve regional deterrence.”  How this translates to “China moves its missiles closer to the Indian border,” only PTI can tell us.

But this is just symptomatic of a larger malaise plaguing large sections of our media: a flippant regard for facts, for corroboration, a desperate quest for sensational news items (even when none exist), for “dumbing-down,” and for drama above all else.

Were that not the case, stories such as this extraordinary piece about Mr. Obama’s visit to India would have never been published. Folks, 34 warships including one aircraft carrier is not a “presidential entourage.” It is an invasion. 

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